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On-line social network sites are a major organ of civic life. For many, 
they are a primary source of news and locus of political discussion. 
Algorithms mediate the online interactions of millions of participants 
with potentially vast political implications. In such a world, 
intellectual silos of social theory, systems theory, and engineering 
must collapse lest political outcomes be driven by unconscious or 
illegitimate actors. 
This paper has two purposes, one nested in the other. In the first 
major section, I will show how normative claims from social 
theory can inspire the technical design of public communications 
infrastructure. I draw political values from work on the public sphere 
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by Habermas [1] and Fraser. [2] Their concerns about media power and 
participatory disparity, respectively, can be articulated with the tools 
of network science [3] to inform the design of relevance algorithms 
[4] for networked publics. [5] For the sake of concreteness, I present 
@TheTweetserve, an open source Twitter bot I built based on these 
principles.
The second purpose is to justify and extend an invitation to sociologists 
of technology to join recursive publics, as identified by Kelty: publics 
that openly design, build and maintain their own communication 
infrastructure using the Internet. [6] Addressing researchers whose 
work is itself mediated by networked publics, I present this invitation 
as a way of managing context collapse between researchers of different 
disciplines. This paper itself is an attempt at disciplinary collapse 
modeled on context collusion. [7] I offer disciplinary collapse within 
recursive publics as an alternative to a pessimism about our ability to 
contend in a scholarly way with powerful algorithms. [8]
In the final section of this paper, I open the research problem of 
designing a recursive networked public suitable for our own scholarly 
communication. We can approach the design of such a system as 
legal scholars studying social laws, laws that can be implemented 
as software code. I propose that Habermas’s distinction between 
social system, where action is coordinated non-linguistically through 
steering media like money and power, and social lifeworld where 
action is coordinated through linguistic consensus, is useful for 
thinking about the goals of such a scholarly, recursive, and networked 
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public. A public designed to enable mutual understanding through 
communicative action among scholars could serve as a model for 
other networked publics.
Networked publics: theory and design
In this paper, I will analyze the workings of social network sites such 
as Twitter and Facebook as networked publics, following boyd (2010). 
I will not recapitulate vastness of academic literature on publics and 
the public sphere.  I hope not to build on top of that but rather to 
demonstrate how one can cut across it towards what those in human-
computer interaction (HCI) would call “implications for design.” 
[9] To this end I will focus on the works of Jürgen Habermas, who 
originated scholarship on the public sphere in 1962 and has developed 
his position throughout his career. I anticipate that similar moves 
from theory to application can be made from others’s scholarship.
I focus on the concept of the public sphere raised by Habermas and 
in particular his ideal of the public as a space of discourse among 
participants with equal voice. Elaborating on the challenges of 
accomplishing such an ideal, I draw on Fraser’s critiques of actually 
existing publics and their intrapublic and interpublic inequality. 
Setting discussion of non-networked publics aside as beyond the 
scope of this paper, I translate these concepts into the domain of 
networked publics and argue that our understanding of a relevant 
notion of inequality within them can be articulated using the tools of 
network science, [10] and particularly through the idea of preferential 
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attachment, a social mechanism through which the well-connected 
become even more well-connected. That fact combined with the 
relevance algorithms [11] that determine what content is displayed 
as relevant lead some networked publics, such as Twitter, to fall far 
short of the Habermasian ideal. 
The affordances of network publics enable our very specific 
understanding of this form of inequality. They also allow the 
construction of actually existing alternatives. I will describe @
TheTweetserve, a bot that embeds an alternative algorithmic 
mechanism within the larger context of Twitter as a public sphere. This 
intervention is a simple demonstration of how technical interventions 
and algorithm provision can be motivated by normative social theory 
and a form of political expression. It also exposes design trade-
offs that I argue must be taken into account in critically informed 
discussion of networked publics.
Ideals and critiques of the public sphere
Jürgen Habermas’s early work on the public sphere was originally 
published in German in 1962, then later translated under the title 
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into 
a Category of Bourgeois Society. [12] It described the development 
of what he named the bourgeois public sphere, where “bourgeois” 
refers to its origins in the merchant class in the European Renaissance. 
As this class grew in political power relative to the old aristocracy, 
it needed spaces and media, such as salons and newspapers, with 
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which it could coordinate business and government interests in the 
interest of global expansion. Habermas named these spaces and 
media collectively the public sphere.
Habermas’s interest in the public sphere is due partly to his interest 
in the legitimate foundation of democracy. Without a social process 
where private citizens can discuss their concerns and come to 
agreement, political or economic power will go unchecked by citizen 
oversight. In Habermas’s philosophical work in the 70’s he theorized 
the conditions under which consensus arising from discussion is 
a legitimate synthesis of the interests of the participants: the ideal 
speech situation. [13] Among the conditions of this ideal are that 
nobody capable of making a relevant contribution is excluded and 
that they have an equal voice. [14]
Fraser critiques Habermas’s conception of the public sphere on 
several specific points, some of which I will take up here. [15] One 
critique concerns the role of social status and power within public 
discourse. In Habermas’s conception, social status—such as conferred 
by class or gender—should be bracketed in public discourse. Fraser 
contends that this obscures the way status affects discursive outcomes 
by affecting conversations at the level of turn-taking and to whom 
responses are directed. Fraser argues that far from being bracketed, 
within an equitable public this manifestation of social power must be 
explicitly thematized and counteracted.
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Fraser also critiques the singularity of Habermas’s conception of the 
public sphere, noting the historical existence of multiple counterpublics, 
wherein marginalized groups resolved and articulated their own 
interests before rejoining the dominant “bourgeois masculinist” 
public. For Fraser, the existing public sphere in stratified society is 
a nexus of competing unequal publics, and the ideal multicultural 
public sphere maintains a multiplicity of publics of different cultures. 
While “this need not preclude the possibility of an additional, more 
comprehensive arena in which members of different, more limited 
publics talk across lines of cultural diversity,” for Fraser in 1990, the 
possibility of such a comprehensive inter-cultural public center is an 
empirical question.
Fraser’s critiques challenged Habermas’s conception of the public 
sphere, while in many ways maintaining the ideal of its being the site 
of democratic legitimation in society. In the spirit of Habermas’s call 
for an ideal speech situation with participatory parity, she raises issues 
of interpublic and intrapublic inequality that prevent actually existing 
publics from achieving this ideal. Other considerations preventing 
the actuality of an ideal public arise in Habermas’s own work, which 
is critical of the role of consumer-oriented media. Habermas notes 
that media-driven discussion is not based in interpersonal consensus 
but rather on factors like who owns channels of mass communication.
Both Habermas and Fraser were observant of historical publics and 
held them to a higher normative standard of participatory parity. They 
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set the stage for an evaluation of contemporary networked publics 
on the basis of how they structure discursive participation, topology 
(including their singularity or plurality, as well as their interpublic 
connectivity), and susceptibility to media power.
Networked power in networked publics
Carrying these concepts into the 21st century, we can ask how well 
contemporary networked publics approximate an ideal speech 
situation, and to what extent they are beset by the problems of media 
power and inequality. I argue that the tools of network science [16] 
give us ways to think rigorously about parity and power within 
networked publics. This rigorous understanding can then be used to 
design politically motivated technical interventions.
boyd notes that one of the significant features of networked publics 
is the existence of friends lists. She explains that choosing whether 
or not to ‘friend’ another user is a social and political choice that can 
be read as an articulation of the public, a statement of the people 
with whom the user imagines themselves in association. [17] In 
contemporary networked publics like Twitter and Facebook, the 
friends list also plays a crucial role in determining information flows 
within the system. On Facebook, one’s friendships are an input to 
the EdgeRank algorithm that determines what is displayed on one’s 
newsfeed. [18] It is also a means by which users manage who has 
permission to see their updates at all. In the case of Twitter, a user’s 
timeline consists of updates from all the accounts they follow. To a first 
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order of approximation, the number of followers one has on Twitter 
is an indication of ones influence. This is an extreme simplification, 
one that features so widely in public perception that there is a large 
market for fake Twitter followers. In practice, not only how many 
followers a user has, but who those followers are contributes to a 
users ability to control public discourse.
Castells gives the name “networked power” to the power an agent 
has because of their place within a network. [19] He uses “network-
making power” to refer to the power of agents who control the structure 
mediating the network. These concepts are useful for thinking about 
networked publics: users with influential followers on Twitter have 
substantial networked power. The Twitter corporation itself has great 
network-making power. My own ethnographic research of Twitter 
[20] has confirmed the role that highly followed accounts—whether 
they are professional social media personalities like digital journalists 
or hobbyist micro-celebrities [21]—have in shaping public discourse, 
especially around what topics go viral.
The field of network science, which combines mathematical graph 
theory with social network analysis, has flourished because of the 
availability of data from social network sites. This data has confirmed 
robust laws of social network formation. One of these regularities is 
extreme inequality in number of social connections. In mathematical 
graph theory, the number of connections a node has with others is 
called its degree. In many graphs generated by social process, such 
as the friendship graphs from social network sites, node degree is 
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distributed according to a power law distribution. This is the same sort 
of distribution as the distribution of global wealth—highly unequal, 
with a few very rich and many very poor. In contrast, the distribution 
of personal height is normally distributed—roughly bell shaped, 
with many people around average height and a few extremes in both 
directions. [22] Networks that have power law degree distribution 
are called scale-free networks.
Network scientists Barabási and Albert have sought to explain the 
prevalence of scale-free networks through a general mechanism called 
preferential attachment. [23] If when a network grows new nodes are 
more likely to connect to nodes with high degree than nodes with 
low degree, then it will grow into a scale-free network. An example of 
preferential attachment is when Twitter recommends that new users 
follow celebrities or other well-known figures when they join the 
network. Empirical studies of social network sites have confirmed 
that their networks are scale free and that their growth shows 
preferential attachment, specifically through social recommendation 
to peers [24] and content sharing. [25] This scientific result has social 
implications: preferential attachment on social network sites implies 
large disparities in networked power.
In a networked public, networked power is as useful conceptualization 
of intrapublic inequality. Operationalizing forms of networked power 
within the language of network science gives us purchase on how 
unequal distributions of power are reproduced. If one accepts number 
of followers as a first approximation of networked power, then when 
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both media outlets and individuals participate in the same network, 
it follows from the above reasoning that preferential attachment will 
compound any initial inequality due to financial investment, social 
status, or access. These participatory disparities then affect discursive 
outcomes as those with privileged positions in the network direct 
information flow.
Another characteristic of social networks, as opposed to biological 
and technical networks, is assortative mixing, the property that 
nodes with high degree are more likely to be connected with other 
nodes with high degree. [26] This is a special case of another common 
property of network formation, homophily, the tendency of people 
to connect with others similar to them. [27] Assuming, as we have, 
that node degree is correlated with networked power, this implies 
that powerful people within a networked public will be clustered 
together. An assortatively mixed network looks a lot like the public 
sphere described by Fraser: not just marked by inequality between 
individuals, but between publics and counterpublics. [28] Thus, 
network science provides tools for understanding not just intrapublic 
inequality, but also interpublic inequality, subsuming these under a 
broader and more flexible idea of network topology.
Network science paints a bleak picture for equal participation in 
the public sphere. As social networks grow naturally, they reinforce 
existing inequality of networked power within them. This process is 
especially transparent in networked publics because of their explicit 
representation of the social graph. The implication is that media 
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power and privileged groups will dominate discourse in networked 
publics, and so these publics will fail to arrive at democratically 
legitimate discursive outcomes. However, that networked power is 
explicit within the social graph is also an opportunity. Rather than 
bracketing these social differences, in the spirit of Fraser we can 
design networked publics that counteract them.
Actually-existing alternatives
We need not resign ourselves to the bleak picture of inequality. By 
acquiring and exercising network-making power, we can alter the 
algorithmic structures of networked publics for political purposes. 
As a demonstration of this, I have developed a Twitter bot, @
TheTweetserve, which counteracts preferential attachment.
@TheTweetserve is inspired by The Listserve, a project developed by 
Josh Begley, Alvin Chang, Yoonjo Choi, Greg Dorsainville, and Zena 
Koo in 2012. The Listserve is a mailing list that is free to join. Once a 
day, a subscriber is selected at random and given the opportunity to 
write everyone else on the list. At the time of this writing, The Listserve 
has over 20,000 subscribers. In light of the preceding analysis, The 
Listserve’s simple mechanism of random selection avoids many of 
the shortcomings of networked publics. Members are equal before 
the algorithm that controls the discourse.
@TheTweetserve works similarly. Twitter users “subscribe” to the 
bot by following it and then mentioning it. They have the option 
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of following it and not mentioning it if they would rather “lurk”. 
At regular intervals, @TheTweetserve randomly selects a subscriber 
and retweets their most recent tweet. All subscribers have an equal 
probability of being selected.
Normally on Twitter those who post most frequently and have 
the highest number of followers are more likely to be heard. @
TheTweetserve follows a different logic. It is indifferent to the 
number of followers of its subscribers. Infrequent tweeters are not 
disadvantaged compared to frequent tweeters that may have greater 
access to Twitter, for example through more expensive smart phone 
data plans. 
I have published the source code, a mere 150 lines of Python, on 
GitHub, a code hosting and issue tracking site that is itself a networked 
public. [29] The code has an open source license and I welcome 
feature requests, including requests for improved documentation. 
Dear Reader, this is a backstage pass.
It is possible to build such a technical intervention because Twitter has 
an open Application Program Interface (API). Through this interface, 
external applications communicate with Twitter ’s infrastructure, 
reading and writing to its database and interacting with objects 
defined within it. This API is well-documented on Twitter ’s website.
[30]
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At the time of this writing, @TheTweetserve has attracted under fifty 
followers and has not in my estimation had a significant impact on the 
topology of Twitter as a networked public. Unlike many automated 
Twitter accounts, it lacks a growth mechanism; it does not, for example, 
automatically follow other users to get their attention. Chang notes 
that @TheTweetserve currently lacks a ‘value’ mechanism, something 
that would select for or encourage high quality contributions. This 
could be another reason for its failure to revolutionize networked 
society. [31] This highlights a concrete design trade-off. Davies points 
out the tension between social equality and consumer quality. [32] 
To filter subscriber’s content by algorithmically estimated quality 
would be to make a political choice that is more distant from the 
Habermasian ideal. 
I present @TheTweetserve as an actually existing alternative to 
networked publics governed by commercially motivated relevance 
algorithms. [33] I do so with some measure of irony. Users may not 
be motivated to use social network sites that expose them to others 
chosen at random. Thinking beyond a discussion of the available 
technological options, do the motivation of users preclude these sites 
from serving as ideal Habermasian public spheres? When people 
choose to use social network sites organized around logic chosen by 
site providers, does that not speak to the success of that design? The 
choice to use Facebook or Twitter is a choice of complicity in these 
networked publics’ political logic, though alternatives exist.
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My invitation and challenge to the scholarly community is to produce 
a concrete design of something better. @TheTweetserve is a naïve 
prototype. What would a more advanced version look like? For 
example, it is possible to build a similar bot that takes positioning 
within the social network into account when determining relevance. 
Rather than select subscribers from a uniform distribution, a networked 
public that was more sensitive to Fraser’s critiques could first select a 
cluster of users—one of many unequal publics and counterpublics—
and then retweet a representative selected from within it. This is just 
one of a vast array of possibilities.
Not all political goals can be articulated using network science 
and implemented into technical architecture. For example, other 
conditions of Habermas’s ideal speech situation include the lack 
of coercion and the participant’s ability to express their authentic 
interests free of deception and self-deception. I do not see how these 
can be addressed directly with social network site design (though this 
may be due to lack of imagination). I have left these considerations to 
one side not because they are unimportant but because of the scope 
of this paper. A more complete science of networked publics, one 
that I think is well worth aspiring to, would combine both a deep 
technical understanding of the dynamics of the digital network and 
a nuanced account of its social context. The following section of this 
paper discusses how networked publics provide the conditions of 
such a science and proposes a way forward.
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Expanding the recursive public through 
disciplinary collapse
In the preceding sections, I have provided a concrete example of 
how historically informed normative social theory can be articulated 
using network science, then translated into design criteria and 
implemented as an actually existing networked public. This research 
takes inspiration from the Values In Design approach, [34] which 
combines philosophical inquiry, technical implementation, and 
empirical study into a unified, pragmatic activity. In addition to its 
value as research in its own right, I intend this work as demonstration 
against a scholarly attitude that critical political study of networked 
publics and their technical implementation should or must be 
separate intellectual disciplines. In the remainder of this paper, I will 
argue that achieving normative goals in actually existing networked 
publics requires disciplinary collapse.
Going beyond exclusively sociological inquiry
I have demonstrated above a sociotechnical inquiry into networked 
publics and the algorithms they employ. I have done so in order to 
build upon and challenge a prominent scholarly position of which 
Tartleton Gillespie’s “The Relevance of Algorithms” is an exquisite 
representative. [35] In the interest of clarifying my own position, I 
will address that article here directly. It is interesting to note that even 
before its official publication this article has been distributed widely 
over the Internet as a PDF. As such, it is already a noted intellectual 
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accomplishment that has inspired many. In more ways than one it is 
a very relevant article.
Gillespie is concerned with the kind of inquiry that is brought 
to bear on public relevance algorithms, the algorithms used by 
networked publics and search engines to determine what information 
should be seen by users. Arguing against “simplistic technological 
determinism”, he writes, “we must firmly resist putting technology 
in the explanatory driver’s seat.... A sociological analysis must not 
conceive of algorithms as abstract, technical achievements, but must 
unpack the warm human and institutional choices that lie behind 
these cold mechanisms.” He goes on to point out many examples of 
how various features of the user interfaces of social network sites reify 
socially constructed categories and reflect the commercial interests 
of algorithm providers despite prevalent rhetoric suggesting these 
systems’ objectivity.
Gillespie writes critically about both the availability of this commercial 
technical infrastructure to researchers and the computational 
techniques using data collected from them as social scientific methods. 
He notes the difficulty researchers have in understanding the specifics 
of many commercial relevance algorithms due to lack of “backstage 
access”. These algorithms are not shared with the public for practical 
reasons of maintaining profitability and preventing spammers from 
gaming them. 
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Because these algorithms and databases created by them are not 
available to researchers, Gillespie argues that we should be skeptical of 
the computational methods they enable. He notes that these methods 
are “alluring” and “seductive” to social scientists but are suspect 
when the data used by them is created by proprietary systems. He 
writes, somewhat cryptically, “Computational research techniques 
are not barometers of the social. They produce hieroglyphs: shaped by 
the tool by which they are carved, requiring of priestly interpretation, 
they tell powerful but often mythological stories—usually in service 
of the gods.”
These considerations lead Gillespie to a pessimism about our ability 
to understand the powerful algorithms that govern us. “[T]here may 
be something, in the end, impenetrable about algorithms. They are 
designed to work without human intervention, they are deliberately 
obfuscated, and they work with information on a scale that is hard 
to comprehend (at least without other algorithmic tools).” Gillespie 
is correct to warn social scientists against simplistic technological 
determinism and the problems of proprietary search engines and 
social media pose for our engagement with them as users and 
researchers. But these impediments are surmountable. 
There are alternative algorithms that are not so deliberately 
obscured, such as the cases of well-documented API’s and open 
source software. These technologies afford computational methods 
and understanding that are not hieroglyphic. They are an alphabet 
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with concrete social interpretation, legible to those with sufficient 
training or an open mind. So as a productive alternative to purely 
sociological criticality of proprietary algorithms, I offer an invitation 
to sociologists of technology to engage in sociotechnical inquiry 
with algorithm providers that are committed to transparency. There 
are technologists who are both committed to transparency of their 
algorithms and invested in the social impact of their work. Many of 
these belong to the Free Software movement, an example of what 
Kelty identifies as a recursive public. [36]
An invitation to engage recursive publics
Kelty defines recursive publics as “publics concerned with the ability 
to build, control, modify, and maintain the infrastructure that allows 
them to come into being in the first place.” He applies this concept 
to the communities that build the infrastructure of the Internet, such 
as Usenet, email, the World Wide Web, UNIX, free and open source 
software, and web standards. His work shows how these communities 
are engaged in political activity not primarily as vocal ideologues but 
in the creation, modification, and maintenance of software, networks, 
and law. In ways normally unrecognized by political theory, these 
actions can express ideas about the moral order of society. They can 
also challenge political and economic power through the creation of 
actually existing alternatives.
Recursive publics build foundational infrastructure for the Internet 
and participate in the production of application layer functionality 
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such as social network sites. Facebook and Twitter both employ 
developers who work on open source software. Wordpress.com, a 
commercial social blog host that is built on the open source Wordpress 
software, and GitHub, which open sources almost all of its code 
[37] are two examples of networked publics that have deep roots in 
recursive publics. As a matter of best practice, successful open source 
communities deliberately put as much of their communication as 
possible into public and archived fora, [38] alleviating Gillespie’s 
concern about limited backstage access. I have developed and 
presented @TheTweetserve as a demonstration of these practices and 
their relevance to networked publics.
Froomkin has studied the practices of the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF), a committee originally comprised of graduate 
students that determines the protocols and standards of the Internet. 
[39] He claims that this group and perhaps others involved in the 
Internet standards process fulfill Habermas’s notoriously demanding 
standards of consensus legitimizing discourse. This is a noteworthy 
historical example of a scholarly recursive public self-organized for 
legitimacy—a legitimacy so complete that for the vast majority of 
Internet users its influence is unquestioned and invisible.
I invite those involved in the critical study of networked publics to 
participate in recursive publics and include them in their imagined 
audience. While there is important and substantial scholarship on 
open source communities, rarely is work on normative social theory 
directed to them as an audience. This is due partly because of the 
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natively technical disciplinary orientation of many recursive publics 
and the perception that they are not receptive to other forms of inquiry. 
If scholars accept this invitation, perhaps one day our participation in 
the networked publics will not be based on ignorance and unfairness, 
but rather on legitimate consensus about norms and infrastructure. 
This cannot be accomplished while maintaining clean distinctions 
between academic disciplines.
Disciplinary collapse
Thinking reflexively about the process of the research I present here, 
I recall that it began with a conversation on Twitter involving myself 
and two other researchers whom I had never met in person, Nathan 
Matias and Brian Keegan. [40] Matias introduced me to Fraser’s work; 
Keegan introduced me to assortative mixing in social networks. Later, 
while developing @TheTweetserve as an aspiring relevance algorithm 
provider, I followed a link to where a preprint draft of Gillespie was 
posted on-line. [41]
This paper is the result of context collapse. Davis and Jurgenson 
review how the collapse of social contexts is a noted characteristic of 
interactions in networked publics, and distinguish between context 
collision, or accidental collapse, and context collusion, or intentional 
collapse. [42] As more of academic discussion moves to open access 
journals and more researchers encounter each other online, the 
mechanism of context collapse plays more of a role in the encounters 
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between normally contextually separated academic disciplines. These 
collapses may be disciplinary collisions or disciplinary collusions.
I maintain that these collapses are productive both for scholarly 
understanding of networked publics and for the pragmatic goal of 
improving our technical options. We (speaking now to recursive 
publics generally, inclusive of researchers studying social theory, 
networked publics, and values in design) stand to gain more if we are, 
by default, open to each other’s ideas. While this process of collapse 
will not always be easy, it can bear fruit in the form of new technical 
and political options. [43] 
To the extent that networked publics coordinate the interactions 
between those that research them, we work under conditions of context 
collapse and preferential attachment. We can take responsibility for 
the infrastructure we use for scholarly communication, including the 
relevance algorithms we employ, by joining recursive publics. How 
then shall we steer the sociotechnical system of our own discourse 
so that it serves our interests legitimately? For an answer, I will look 
once again to Habermas.
Communication and law in networked 
recursive publics
This line of inquiry has come full circle. The study of networked 
publics and the legitimacy of discourse mediated by them implicates 
Interface / Volume 1 / Issue 1 / Theorizing the Web 201422 /
our scholarly communication about the study. Those of us doing this 
research in recursive publics take responsibility for the networking 
infrastructure itself. We cannot escape the normative question: what 
politics should be embodied in the networked publics that coordinate 
scholarly communication? How can these publics be designed to fulfill 
our own intellectual function, let alone their broader civic function, 
in the face of unequal power and context collapse?
The answer depends on our changing relationship to this infrastructure. 
As we shift from a position of purely sociological critique of opaque 
algorithms beyond our control to a sociotechnical engagement with 
transparent systems we are responsible for, our relationship to this 
technology changes. It ceases to be the expression of remote powers 
and becomes and expression of our own interests. This suggests our 
work should aim at reconciling our own conflicting interests and 
balancing inevitable trade-offs in the interest of more just design.
Code as law
It may be useful to frame our relationship to technology in this case as 
one of “code as law.” Lessig has argued that when software regulates 
society, it plays a role analogous to law. This framing of code as law is 
especially pertinent to recursive publics. [44] It empowers us to study 
algorithms and other aspects of networked publics as if we were legal 
scholars informing a legislature of designers and engineers. It also 
positions our support and use of networking platforms and services 
as a democratic choice.
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Putting to one side the ambitious goal of designing the networked 
public sphere of a democratic nation-state, we can consider the 
humbler but still interesting question of how to design a networked 
and recursive public of scholars. What system of source code and 
norms should guide such a public? Such an inquiry raises familiar 
questions of access, accountability, and power, but in an immediate 
and actionable way. A public design perfected for our own purposes 
could serve as a model for other, larger communities.
Designing systems for the lifeworld
What should such a public be designed to accomplish? I submit that if 
we are to navigate the complexity of our own disciplinary collapse, we 
should design publics to enable what Habermas calls “communicative 
action”—action oriented towards mutual understanding, as opposed 
to strategic actions motivated by individual gain. Habermas made 
this distinction almost 20 years after his early work on the bourgeois 
public sphere in The Theory of Communicative Action. [45] In these 
works, he leaves behind the concept of the ideal speech situation. He 
shifts from considering legitimacy as the product of a situation to 
legitimacy as the outcome of the human intention to reach agreement. 
He then draws out the implications of his theory of action for the 
interaction between civil society and political and economic power.  
In this work, Habermas draws a distinction between the lifeworld, 
those social backgrounds and contexts where it is possible to 
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coordinate action through linguistic consensus, and system, where 
action is coordinated non-linguistically through other media such as 
money and power—or “steering media”, in Habermas’s terminology. 
Habermas gestures at civil society institutions as the site of the 
lifeworld, in contrast with state bureaucracies and the market as 
examples of systems. [46] [47] He elaborates on the relationship 
between the steering media and lifeworld-coordinated action in this 
passage from The Theory of Communicative Action, volume 2:
“The transfer of action coordination from language over to 
steering media means an uncoupling of interaction from 
lifeworld contexts. Media such as money and power attach 
to empirical ties; they encode a purposive-rational attitude 
toward calculable amounts of value and make it possible 
to exert generalized, strategic influence on the decisions of 
other participants while bypassing processes of consensus-
oriented communication. Inasmuch as they do not merely 
simplify linguistic communication, but replace it with 
a symbolic generalization of rewards and punishments, 
the lifeworld contexts in which processes of reaching 
understanding are always devalued in favor of media-
steered interactions; the lifeworld is no longer needed for 
the coordination of action.” [48] 
For Habermas, the interaction between lifeworld and system is 
mediated by law, which is intelligible to civil society but also a 
controlling force upon or function within the steering media. [49] In 
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networked publics, I submit that lifeworld and system are mediated 
by source code, the intelligible and mutable specification of non-
linguistic control mechanisms. In recursive publics, that source code 
is available for discursive consideration and there are norms for 
changing it in light of decisions made in the lifeworld. I challenge 
scholars to design a recursive networked public that is a viable and 
legitimate system for supporting our scholarly communicative action. 
Fraser’s critiques of the public sphere noted above are some of the 
reasons why design of such a public is not a trivial task but rather 
one that requires subtle thinking about, for example, social network 
topology. Participatory disparity is an example of what a recursive 
networked public’s code can regulate against.
I have in this paper traced a movement from social theory (Habermas, 
Fraser) to abstract operationalization (Watts, Castells) to open technical 
implementation. This implementation shows how abstract theoretical 
ideas can be made concrete but also exposes design tradeoffs that 
must be considered in responsible criticism of technology. This work 
serves as a demonstration to ward off pessimism about researcher’s 
ability to understand critical social algorithms (Gillespie) and invite 
other researchers to join and write for recursive publics that build, 
control, and maintain their own communications infrastructure 
(Kelty). An open and actionable problem facing researchers today is 
the design of a recursive networked public that supports scholarly 
communicative action about its own goals and the implementation of 
appropriately chosen algorithms as this public system’s code or law.
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